Rome, 5 Nov. (LaPresse) – “In all Anglo-Saxon adversarial trials, a conviction cannot be handed down following an acquittal unless new evidence has come to light and the trial is restarted from the beginning. I have always said that a change in this regard would be reasonable.” So said Justice Minister Carlo Nordio on the sidelines of Question Time. “As far as I am aware, there are no bills regarding the non-appealability of acquittals,” he added, “but in principle – and I have always maintained this, ever since we approved the reform preventing ‘reformatio in peius’ for minor offences – that is, an appeal resulting in a conviction following an acquittal – given that under the current code a conviction can only be handed down when the evidence is ‘beyond reasonable doubt’, how can you convict beyond reasonable doubt when a previous judge, or even two previous judges, as in the case of Garlasco, had doubts to the extent of acquitting the defendant? ‘It is a principle that needs to be resolved,’ he adds. ‘Either we do away with the principle of reasonable doubt – which, however, is a cornerstone of civilisation – or we must explain how it can happen that a person, having been acquitted once or twice, can be convicted without any new evidence having come to light and without the trial being restarted from the beginning.’
Garlasco, Nordio: “You cannot convict someone who has been acquitted. The rules on appeals need to be reformed”
Rome, 5 Nov. (LaPresse) – “In all Anglo-Saxon adversarial trials, a conviction cannot be handed down following an acquittal unless new evidence has come to light and the trial is restarted from the beginning. I have always said that a change in this regard would be reasonable.” So said Justice Minister Carlo Nordio on the sidelines of Question Time. “As far as I am aware, there are no bills regarding the non-appealability of acquittals,” he added, “but in principle – and I have always maintained this, ever since we approved the reform preventing ‘reformatio in peius’ for minor offences – that is, an appeal resulting in a conviction following an acquittal – given that under the current code a conviction can only be handed down when the evidence is ‘beyond reasonable doubt’, how can you convict beyond reasonable doubt when a previous judge, or even two previous judges, as in the case of Garlasco, had doubts to the extent of acquitting the defendant? ‘It is a principle that needs to be resolved,’ he adds. ‘Either we do away with the principle of reasonable doubt – which, however, is a cornerstone of civilisation – or we must explain how it can happen that a person, having been acquitted once or twice, can be convicted without any new evidence having come to light and without the trial being restarted from the beginning.’